Wednesday, May 1, 2024

The Political Opponent is a Resource

 

Philosophical Bits #4:

Epistemology for Social Creatures

 

            Aristotle famously observed that “man is by nature a social animal.”  Human beings need each other to live; we certainly need each other to live well.  Aristotle said the solitary person who somehow believes he doesn’t need other people is more like a beast (below us) or a god (far above us).  Our social nature has implications for almost every aspect of human life, from economics to psychology and religion.

            Nowhere is this more obvious than in science.  Despite the stereotypical image of the lone mad scientist uncovering some heretofore unknown natural law—an image that shows up in literature since Frankenstein—modern science is most definitely a cooperative social endeavor.  Not only do scientists work in teams (often very large and well-funded teams), they publish their findings in scientific journals open to anyone.  Everyone’s work is checked and confirmed (or disconfirmed) by others.  The current generation of researchers build on the theories and discoveries of past scientists, so the social nature of science extends over time, not just geography.

            What is true of science is true of epistemology in general.  The “knowledge business,” in almost all its forms, is a cooperative social activity.  A philosopher may think alone, and he may write an essay in solitude (as I am doing now).  But then he exposes his work to others’ criticisms and corrections.  Both humility and realism teach us to take the criticisms of others seriously.  Most of the time, we learn together.

            A skeptic might object: We don’t learn, because “learning” implies objective truth.  In philosophy there are always arguments for and against, so we should never say we “know.”  But extreme skepticism refutes itself, in that it says we know that we cannot know.  It’s better to take skepticism as a warning.  Yes, the pursuit of knowledge is a slow business, filled with almost as many missteps as progress.  But we do learn.

            Now, someone might agree that natural science has progressed in the last six hundred years, greatly increasing our knowledge of biology, chemistry, astronomy, physics, ecology, and so on.  But what about the so-called “soft” sciences?  Have we gained knowledge in economics, sociology, and psychology?  What about the arts and philosophy?  Do we understand beauty or truth or justice any better than our distant ancestors?  It seems that the further we get from the hard sciences, the less confident we are that we are making progress.

            Let’s face it, the critic may say: Philosophical “fads” come and go.  Marxism was an all-encompassing philosophical theory with drastic implications for economics, politics, and morality—but true believers are few.  Positivism dominated philosophy for thirty or forty years, but now it’s dead.  Deconstructionism was all the rage in the 90s, but its influence wanes.  So, maybe there is no progress in philosophy.  Maybe we just recycle old ideas in new guises. 

            Maybe.  But if not, we need each other in moral philosophy as much as we do in natural science.

            I’m a moral realist.  That is, I believe there is such a thing as moral truth, which means a person can sincerely believe in some moral proposition and be wrong.  Examples.  Within the last 100 years, well-educated persons in this country have pressed for eugenics laws, believing that modern science (evolutionary theory) supported the conclusion that some people are mentally and/or physically defective.  Others advocated for a socialist revolution, believing that only radical redistribution of ownership of the means of production could lead to economic justice.  Others defended racial segregation in law and custom, believing in the inherent superiority of white people over black people.

            These were all sincere beliefs held by educated people in this country in the recent past.  As a moral realist, I think they were wrong, which means there must be some other view which is right or at least closer to the truth.  Moral truth, if we can get it, is a very great good.  We should pursue it.

            (Notice the self-referential folding of that last paragraph.  The proposition, “We should pursue moral truth,” is itself a moral truth.)

            If philosophical fads come and go, and if well-educated people can sincerely believe moral falsehoods, our pursuit of moral truth will be fraught.  We almost certainly will make mistakes.  But since we are social beings, we have a great resource: other people, especially those who disagree with us.

            Scientists publish their findings, which opens the door to criticism and/or confirmation.  The search for knowledge in moral philosophy should be equally open to criticism.  We need each other.  Those who disagree with us on moral questions, including political questions, are precisely the people we need to hear.  As my friend Ron Mock likes to say, the political opponent is a resource for better decisions.