Why Should We Listen to Evil People?
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice of Politics (2002) was my first philosophy book (other than my dissertation, which remains unpublished). The book’s argument depends on three stipulative definitions. First, I defined “politics” as the art and science of making group decisions. Any decision affecting a group of people is a political decision. “Politics” thus includes corporate politics, family politics, and church politics, as well as civic politics.
Second, I defined “political opponent” (or “enemy”) as anyone who opposes a political actor’s proposed policy. On this definition, when two members of the library committee argue for competing policies, they qualify as political opponents, for as long as their disagreement lasts. Two Democrats or two Republicans qualify as political enemies when they support different versions of a bill one has introduced in the legislature. It’s a very broad definition, with the result that we all have “political opponents.” If the political group is the family, and Sarah and I suggest different restaurants for dinner, we qualify as political opponents.
Third, I defined “civility” as virtue consisting in an internal motivation or desire to treat one’s political opponents well. Sarah and I love each other; when we become political opponents, we are highly motivated to treat each other well. But other political opponents might be moved to civility by other emotions. Feelings of friendship, respect, and empathy could motivate a person to treat her political opponents well. Importantly, certain beliefs can also support civility; for example, if someone believes that his political opponent is a person of great worth, more important than the outcome of the political disagreement between them, this belief will move him to treat that person well.
Now, if politics is the art or science of making group decisions, it seems obvious that the proper goal, or telos, of politics is better decisions. It seems equally obvious that civility promotes this goal. In the book, I offer two simple arguments:
1. My political opponent knows stuff I don’t know.
2. Better information tends to produce better decisions.
3. Practicing civility tends to elicit information from the opponent.
Therefore: civility tends to aid better decision making.
Further,
4. Civility tends to maintain communication with the opponent.
5. Political groups will make more decisions, not just the current one.
Therefore, civility tends to sustain the opponent’s contribution to good decisions.
I think these are persuasive arguments. In public talks, I have never found anyone who denies that politics should aim at better decisions. Nevertheless, people often fail to practice civility or attempt to develop feelings or beliefs that support civility. Why is this?
First, we need to recognize that civility is a costly virtue. If you treat your political opponent well, your political opponent might win. Your office rival may get the promotion. Mrs. Brown’s preference for speckled brown carpeting in the sanctuary might be approved. You might end up eating at McDonalds yet again. The Democrats’ budget (or the Republican alternative) could become law. Given the cost of civility, it is not surprising that some people act as if the goal of politics is winning rather than better decisions.
Second, we may fall prey to the “logic of intolerance.” In the book, I outline an argument scheme:
1. The value we support is of extremely high value. (The value might be the eternal souls of our children—or the right to control our own bodies—or something else.)
2. We are aware of the lies of the other side.
3. The lies of the opponents threaten the great value we support.
Therefore, we have a duty to silence the lies of the other side.
Imagine a proposal at an abortion rights convention to invite a pro-life Catholic priest to give a talk on the sanctity of life. Contrariwise, imagine a pro-life convention inviting a NARAL leader to discuss the economic impact of pregnancy for poor women. “We already know what he/she will say. We need to fight for what’s right.” And the unquestioned belief is we already know what is right.
In the book, I claimed that political civility in the United States in the modern period (roughly, up to 1950) was partly supported by modern philosophical doctrines. Modern philosophers, including Descartes, Kant, Hobbes, and Jefferson, gave us a picture of human nature that said we are all rational beings. Your political opponent might differ from you in many ways: economic class, religion, race, ethnic identity, and so forth; but underneath all these differences, you and your opponent share rationality. You can respect your political opponent (even if he is a Catholic or a Protestant—remember the many religious wars of Europe) because of his basic humanity. You can reason with your opponent (even if he is African or Native or White) because underneath it all, reason is universal.
Modernity has given way to a post-modern world. The modern support for civility has disappeared for many people today. Today, many people believe that underneath it all, their political opponents are simply evil. Practical reason is different for different groups; there is no reason to think that “they” will ever understand our situation and needs.
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice of Politics came out twenty years ago. I argued that incivility would probably get worse in our culture. It saddens me to see that prediction come true.
We live in a postmodern age. Christians should never have bought into modern philosophy. Christians should practice civility for explicitly Christian reasons. 1. All people are created by God, and God loves them. Therefore, we have good reason to respect our political opponents. 2. Jesus is our lawgiver. He told us to love our neighbors. 3. Jesus is our example. He prayed for his enemies, even as they killed him. 4. Jesus is the light of the world, and by his Spirit he can speak to anyone. He is the light in the political opponent, so we may learn his will by listening to the opponent.
