Morality and the Good Life,
Part Two
A
fundamental idea in Michael A. Bishop’s 2015 book, The Good Life, is that positive psychologists study “causal
networks” composed of attitudes, emotions, traits, and accomplishments. Because the various parts of a causal network
reinforce each other, such networks tend to persist over time; they are “homeostatic
property clusters.” According to Bishop,
empirical research conducted by positive psychologists demonstrates that causal
networks are a real feature of human psychology; causal networks would exist
whether psychologists study them or not.
Positive psychology is the
study of positive causal networks (PCNs).
What makes a positive causal network
positive? At one point in his book (96-98), Bishop says
“negative causal networks” may also exist, and that a complete theory of
psychology ought to teach us how to recognize and escape negative networks
(e.g. cycles of depression) just as the complete theory would teach us how to
recognize and promote positive networks.
Bishop says little about negative psychology—the “theory of
ill-being”—because his task is to propose a theory of well-being. He does, however, recognize that it is
crucial to his theory to distinguish positive causal networks from negative ones. Bishop says:
...among
all the causal networks (i.e. homeostatic property clusters of emotions,
attitudes, traits, and accomplishments) in the world, the positive ones are
those that feel good, that bring
about states that feel good, and that
are valued by the person or her culture.
(41, emphases added)
Bishop
knows full well that philosophers will take him to task here. That a person or culture values a state does not mean that state is valuable, they will way.
That a state feels good and
leads to states that feel good does not imply well-being, they will say. Bishop
faces this criticism head-on. He
imagines “Josef,” a
…
wicked, sadistic man with a robust PCN.
He instantiates a causal network involving feelings, attitudes, traits,
and interventions in the world that are ‘successful’ in the sense that they
consist of positive experiences for Josef and are valued by Josef and his
culture. This seems to be a real
possibility, particularly in sick societies (think Mengele). (187-188)
A
moralized view of human well-being,
Bishop says, would deny that Josef leads a good life. This is a feature of what Bishop calls “consilience”
views of well-being; on any consilience view, virtue and well-being
converge. Bishop points to Aristotle’s
ethics as a prime example, but there are many other important philosophers who
held such a view. For example, Epicurus
asserted that virtuous living had to be pleasant and that without virtue one
could not have pleasure. Disagreeing
with Epicurus, Kant recognized that goodness and happiness do not always
converge in this life, and for that reason he proposed that rational persons
might believe in an afterlife and a moral God who could guarantee that goodness
and happiness would coalesce in the next life.
Kant was as convinced as Epicurus that goodness and happiness should converge.
But
there are problems with moralized views of well-being, Bishop says. First, there are a great many notions of the
good life on offer, and they disagree significantly about components of the
good life. More importantly for his
project, Bishop says that moralized views of the good life will systematically
exclude empirical evidence from positive psychology. We should seek theories of human well-being
that are scientifically adequate, and one feature of scientific adequacy is
that a theory accommodates empirical evidence.
An
illustration will help. Consider the
debate between vegetarians and carnivores.
For many people, deciding whether to eat meat is a purely instrumental
matter: will a diet containing meat help them reach their life goals (e.g.
health, weight control) as well as a vegetarian diet? However, for other people the decision about
eating meat is an important moral decision.
Some vegetarians argue that it is morally blameworthy for any person (or
for most persons) to eat animal flesh, while carnivores reject that
conclusion. It seems that a moralized
view of well-being has to take some position on this question. Either eating animal flesh is immoral, or it
is permissible (or permissible in some circumstances, in the past or in certain
cultures). Bishop’s first objection to
moralized views of the good life is that such views require that we resolve
such debates before we can study well-being.
Bishop’s second, and more important, objection is that whichever side we
take in regard to eating animal flesh, we will end up ignoring empirical
evidence. After all, there could be (in
this case, there actually is) (1) empirical evidence that vegetarianism can be
an important part of a positive causal network, such that vegetarian practice
leads to a variety of states that feel good and lead to other states that feel
good, and (2) empirical evidence that
eating meat can be an important part of a positive causal network, such that
meat-eating leads to a variety of states that feel good and lead to other
states that feel good. Vegetarians
sometimes point with glee to empirical evidence suggesting that vegetarianism is
“good for you” in one way or another; just as often meat-eaters emphasize
evidence that moderate meat consumption is also “good for you” and pleasurable. Both sides like to use evidence (readily
available) to show that their view promotes well-being. Bishop’s point is that both are right. Therefore we should conclude that well-being is multiply-realizable. A scientific approach to positive psychology
will be inclusive, Bishop says. Therefore, Bishop rejects moralized views of
human well-being.
This
does not mean that Bishop proposes a revolution in our moral thinking. After all, “Josef” really is a wicked human
being. “It’s just a sobering fact about
our world that bad people can have well-being.” (188)
Bishop
says that well-being, studied inclusively according to the network theory, is
an objective feature of human lives, and it is objectively valuable. (211) Individuals,
organizations, and governments can legitimately weigh factors of well-being
when making decisions. Well-being is not
the only factor in making decisions,
Bishop says. An individual may sacrifice
some of his well-being in order to keep a promise or promote the well-being of
others. An organization or government
might spurn a policy that promised to promote the well-being of many if it were
unjust or violated the rights of a few.
(211)
Most
people like to think, with Aristotle or Epicurus, that goodness and happiness
go together. Or, like Kant, they think
that goodness and happiness ought to
go together. Bishop challenges this
predilection. Well-being can be
empirically studied, he argues. We ought
to accept what the research shows us. If
it shows us—and it does—that well-being can be achieved without goodness, we
need to get used to that fact.
To
this point, I have merely explained Bishop’s claims. The next step is to ask: So what? What are the implications if Bishop’s theory
if it is right? I will turn to that
question in my next essay.