Why Do We Tell
the Truth?
Part Two
Human beings can tell the
truth; that is, they have the ability, in many situations, to discover what is
true, and we have the ability, through language, to tell others what we
know. Both parts, discovering truth and
communicating truth, have fascinated philosophers.
Sitting at my desk this morning, I look out the window and see my
granddaughter’s car, a red Prius, sitting in the driveway. Bekah went with her grandmother Sarah to run
errands in McMinnville. They took
Sarah’s car, leaving the Prius here. I
see the car; I know where it is. The
Prius is here, not somewhere else, not in Wyoming. I know this.
Of course, philosophers have worried much about these claims. People fall into error, even about seemingly
obvious truths. Is it possible that
Bekah bought a replica Prius and is fooling me by leaving the second one in the
driveway? Maybe someone slipped a
hallucinogen into my morning tea. Or
maybe I’m dreaming. Do we really know
anything? Does knowledge require
certainty? These and other questions are
part of epistemology, the philosophy of knowing. Skeptics say the problems are insurmountable;
we never really know anything. I think
most philosophers would agree with my Intro to Philosophy professor, Arthur
Roberts, that human beings often rightly distinguish truth from error. As I said in part one of this series, we tell
the truth because we can, in the sense that it is possible.
Now we turn from epistemology to a moral question. Why should we tell the truth?
First, sharing information benefits us. From prehistoric hunter-gatherers to
contemporary engineers and builders, truthful cooperation has enormously
multiplied the goods achieved by human labor.
What percentage of ancient bison-hunters brought down their quarry
without the help of their fellows? The
modern engineer—whether she builds airplanes, apartment buildings, or computer
chips—is even more dependent on others for the success of her work. If we don’t tell the truth, cooperation
collapses. In the language of moral
philosophy, truth-telling is “utile.”
In philosophy class I sometimes asked students to imagine a world
with no moral rule favoring truth-telling.
What would the world be like if deception, in whatever form it might
occur, were as acceptable as telling the truth?
To illustrate, I ask: what time is it?
The student, who wants to escape from a philosophy lecture, says, “3:50”
(the scheduled end of class). But this
is hardly imaginative enough. The reply
could just as well be, “Bananas.” The
point of the silly example is this: If there is no preference for
truth-telling, human beings would not speak languages; they would grunt.
An important theory in moral philosophy, utilitarianism, hangs
everything on this observation. It is
right to tell the truth, say the utilitarians, because it increases overall utility. Everyone knows this, which is why every
culture in the history of the world has had a moral preference for
truth-telling, usually expressed as a rule against lying. Further, the utilitarians say, their theory
explains why every culture also approves of some exceptions to the moral
preference for truth-telling. Precisely
in those cases where deception would produce (or protect) more utility than
telling the truth it is right to lie.
Is that it? Do we tell the truth because it is useful?
Immanuel Kant objected vigorously
against what he called the “serpent-windings” of utilitarianism. Of course, truth-telling is useful, he would
say, but there is a deeper reason why we must not lie.
Consider an experience common to
many parents, babysitters, and other childcare providers. (This is my illustration, not Kant’s.) We teach very young children to tell the
truth, sometimes punishing them for their lies.
And our pedagogy works; children tell us the truth most of the
time. But then comes an unsettling
discovery. Evidence emerges that the
child—usually an older child, perhaps a young teen—lied “successfully,”
deceiving the adult. Only after some
time was the deception found out. In such
cases the adult may ask, “Why did you do that?”
In one sense, the answer is
obvious. The child deceived the adult to
gain some privilege, avoid some consequence, or achieve some result that the
adult would not have permitted otherwise.
The adult already knows this. Her
question—Why did you do that? —is not merely an inquiry into the child’s goal. It’s more personal. The adult’s real question is, “Why did you
treat me that way?” In deceiving the
caregiver, the teen treats the adult as nothing more than a thing, a tool, or
an obstacle. Recognizing her own
feelings, the caregiver might say, “It’s not the lie that hurts; it’s the
disrespect.”
That’s Kant’s point. We deceive other people because we don’t trust
them to do what we want them to do.
Deception is a form of manipulation, a kind of power over other
people. The parent/caregiver in my
illustration feels “disrespected.” According
to Kant, that feeling points to a deep truth.
Kant thought that human beings are, at the root, rational beings. As such, we each have dignity. Each rational being is capable of discovering
the moral law (Kant: “Act only according to that maxim that you can, at the
same time, will that it be a universal law”), because the moral law is
essentially rational. Each time we
encounter a human being, we ought to think something along these lines: “Wow! This is a rational being. This being can recognize the one, universally
binding, moral law! I must treat this
being with deep respect, respect I would offer to Gabriel the archangel or any
other rational moral being.”
I think Kant has something right here,
and I suspect that most people would agree if they reflected on times when
other people have lied to them. We feel
the disrespect when someone manipulates us with lies. We resent it when politicians deceive us (however
much we have come to expect political lies).
And there is almost no surer way to destroy a friendship than by
manipulation and deception.
So now we have two moral reasons for
telling the truth: truth-telling is useful, and the respect we owe to other
people demands it.
Is that enough? Is that all?
I will say more in a third essay.